Flight Guardian: A common avionics architecture for collision avoidance and safe emergency landing for unmanned aerial systems by Mejias Alvarez, Luis & Greer, Duncan
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Mejias, Luis & Greer, Duncan G. (2012) Flight guardian: a common avion-
ics architecture for collision avoidance and safe emergency landing for un-
manned aerial systems. In Proceeding of the 31st Digital Avionics Sys-
tems Conference, IEEE, Crowne Plaza Williamsburg, Williamsburg, VA.
(In Press)
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/53518/
c© Copyright 2012 [please consult the author]
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
FLIGHT GUARDIAN: A COMMON AVIONICS ARCHITECTURE FOR 
COLLISION AVOIDANCE AND SAFE EMERGENCY LANDING FOR 
UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
Luis Mejias, Duncan Greer 
Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation.  
Queensland University of Technology. Brisbane. QLD. Australia 
 
Abstract  
This paper presents an approach to derive 
requirements for an avionics architecture that provide 
onboard sense-and-avoid and autonomous emergency 
forced landing capabilities to a UAS. The approach is 
based on two design paradigms that (1) derive 
requirements analyzing the common functionality 
between these two functions to then derive 
requirements for sensors, computing capability, 
interfaces, etc. (2) consider the risk and safety 
mitigation associated with these functions to derive 
certification requirements for the system design. We 
propose to use the Aircraft Certification Matrix 
(ACM) approach to tailor the system Development 
Assurance Levels (DAL) and architecture 
requirements in accordance with acceptable risk 
criteria. This architecture is developed under the 
name “Flight Guardian”. Flight Guardian is an 
avionics architecture that integrates common sensory 
elements that are essential components of any UAS 
that is required to be dependable. The Flight 
Guardian concept is also applicable to 
conventionally piloted aircraft, where it will serve to 
reduce cockpit workload. 
Introduction 
Operators who wish to deploy UAS for civilian 
applications currently face a significant challenge: 
regulations that define the operational and technical 
requirements are not yet in place and thus UAS cannot 
be fully integrated into the NAS.  Not only has the 
technology to achieve integration not yet been 
developed, but the performance standards have also not 
yet been agreed upon.  Without a clear set of 
performance standards, neither the potential benefits 
that civil UAS bring to society, nor the market 
expansion that has been predicted, will be realised.  In 
this paper, we address the functional and certification 
requirements for two critical UAS capabilities – sense-
and-avoid and automated emergency landing- in a 
unified architecture. 
Yet with a regulatory framework, the 
widespread adoption of UAS in civilian contexts will 
be dictated by the design efficiency and cost 
reduction in their manufacturing. Which in turn has a 
significant impact in UAS dependability.  The notion 
of a “Dependable UAS” is one in which the user can 
trust the UA system to perform its intended job 
without undue risk to themselves, the air vehicle, or 
third parties. The Dependable UAS is also one in 
which the user does not require an exceptional level 
of skill or experience in order to operate it safely. 
In adopting dependability as a critical 
requirement, UAS system designers are also faced 
with the need to respond quickly to niche markets 
(i.e. changes in mission & payload requirements) 
without compromising safety, robustness and cost. 
Therefore, there is a need to amortize development 
cost by maximizing reusability and modularity in 
avionics that can be used across several platforms, 
and more importantly be reconfigured to 
accommodate specific missions. One way to achieve 
this is to design avionics architectures that take 
advantage of common sensors, interfaces and 
onboard computing.  
In this paper, we propose an avionics 
architecture called “Flight Guardian” based on two 
critical onboard functions: (1) the ability to “sense 
and avoid” other aircraft, and (2) the ability to 
conduct a safe landing in case of an emergency. 
These two functions have been identified as two of 
the most critical technological barriers to the 
integration of UAS into the NAS [1, 2]. The design 
of such architecture is approached from two 
perspectives. Our initial approach to the problem is to 
consider the common functionalities between these 
two critical tasks to then derive requirements for 
sensors, computing capability, interfaces, etc. A 
common avionics architecture that adopts elements of 
modularity and dependability can be shared between 
the required aircraft functions, leveraging common 
interface, processing and sensing elements. This will 
significantly reduce cost, equipment footprint and 
improve avionics supportability & maintenance. 
Additionally, we consider the risk and safety 
mitigation associated with these functions to derive 
certification requirements for the system design. We 
propose to use the Aircraft Certification Matrix 
(ACM) approach to tailor the system Development 
Assurance Levels (DAL) and architecture 
requirements in accordance with acceptable risk 
criteria. 
Flight Guardian aims to be standards based, and 
improve the dependability of the UAS by removing 
the need for the user to closely monitor the 
environment around the aircraft, allowing them 
instead to concentrate on the mission results, and 
allowing the UA to operate safely in airspace with 
other airspace users, and over urban areas. 
Dependability in UAS 
The fundamental paradigm in designing the 
Dependable UAS is that safety is inherent in the air 
vehicle. That is, that continued safe flight and landing 
should be independent of any external system or 
signal. This is the principal that underpins 
conventional aviation, and unmanned systems should 
be no different. The definition of dependability that 
has been adopted by the authors is based the Laprie 
model [3, 4] from the computer science literature. 
That is that dependability is the property of a system 
that leads to the degree of trust that a user can place 
in the system to perform its intended function without 
causing undue hazards to itself, its users or its 
environment.   
The Laprie model proposes that attributes of a 
dependable system are availability, reliability, safety, 
confidentiality, integrity and maintainability.  The 
model also introduces the impairments to achieving 
dependability (faults, errors and failures), and means 
of achieving dependability (fault prevention, 
tolerance, removal and forecasting). The attribute of 
dependability that this paper is concerned with is 
safety. Safety of a system (in this case a UAS) is the 
ability of that system to operate without causing 
adverse consequences to its environment. Safety 
should not be confused with reliability – i.e a highly 
reliable system is not necessarily a safe one, even 
though the probability of an unsafe event occurring 
may be reasonably low. 
There are many methods of achieving safety in 
an air vehicle system.  We propose that Flight 
Guardian falls into two classes: fault prevention (i.e. 
prevent collisions with other aircraft), and fault 
tolerance (i.e. given that a particular failure has 
occurred, attempt to land the aircraft without causing 
any further damage). The dependability objectives of 
Flight Guardian will be achieved by adopting 
accepted aircraft development standards for the 
development assurance process which is discussed in 
detail later in this paper. 
Two critical UAS capabilities 
In this section we introduce the functional 
requirements of the sense-and-avoid and automated 
emergency landing systems, and consider the 
requirements they define for the onboard avionics. 
Sense and avoid 
Sense and avoid (SAA) is a necessary function 
of any aircraft system.  There are many possible 
implementation architectures, which may include a 
combination of ground-based and aircraft-based 
sensors.  We only consider aircraft-based systems for 
dependable UAS systems, since any failure of data 
links or ground-based infrastructure should not 
reduce the margins of safety of the air vehicle.  
Furthermore, onboard self-contained, passive, SAA 
systems have the capability to address non-
cooperative 1  scenarios at the same it provide an 
alternative to the Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) 
limitations of many small-medium size UAS. A 
secondary function of the sense-and-avoid system is 
to keep any human operator aware of the system 
status, and of any actions taken by the system.  This 
function, including the role of any human operator, is 
discussed in [5]. 
Sense-and-avoid begins with the detection of 
potential conflicting air traffic, and as a result 
considerable research and development has been 
dedicated to addressing the “sensing” aspect of sense-
                                                      
1 Cooperative implies that all vehicles in the air share information 
through common communication links. Uncooperative denotes 
the issue that vehicles in the sky are not communicated to each 
other, and therefore implies that there is not other way to detect 
other vehicles than a self-contained onboard sensor 
and-avoid. An important design choice in the 
development of sensing and detection systems is the 
type of sensor used to collect information about the 
surrounding environment, and the cooperative or  
uncooperative nature of the system. This is a choice 
that must account for the physical and resource 
limitations of the UAS , and has implications for the 
target detection algorithms and other data processing 
techniques that are employed. Three main functions 
are performed in a collision avoidance scenario, 
detection (monitoring), control and decision-making.  
Detection refers to the ability to identify, extract, 
track and estimate some attributes from the 
conflicting target in the field of view of the sensor. 
This information is then used by the control task to 
generate commands and perform the avoidance 
maneuver.  Finally, decision-making uses 
instantaneous or historical information of the target to 
declare a collision, and in this case propose the most 
adequate resolution by determining the appropriate 
maneuver. 
Physical System Requirements for Sense-and-
avoid 
The detection previously mentioned can be 
performed with a number of active or passive 
sensors. In this paper, we consider passive electro-
optical (EO) sensors for detection. EO sensors offer a 
unique combination of features that make them 
attractive for collision avoidance such as passive, 
compact, light, low power, and high speed. Their 
maturity is at a stage that allows them to be 
operationally feasible even in relatively small UAS 
platforms with conservative SWaP budgets. The 
system architect must trade-off the desired detection 
range for a given intruder size, image resolution, lens 
field of view, image processing rate and false-alarm 
rate to arrive at the required SWaP footprint for the 
air vehicle.  This trade off is discussed in detail in [6]. 
In an avionics context, the main requirement to 
consider in an EO sensor is the interface (data and 
power). This has an impact in the power bus and 
communication with the main processor. The use of 
modern digital data-busses such as IEEE 1394B or 
Gigabit Ethernet [7] is the best choice in terms of 
reusability, modularity and supportability. 
Another important factor is the availability of 
the aircraft state to the collision avoidance payload. 
This information is used for control purposes or 
sensor data conditioning (e.g image stabilization2). 
This data should be available on a common data-bus 
to all modules.  In instances where an end-to-end 
system is developed, the capability of issuing 
avoidance commands from the payload will depend 
on a suitable interface with the aircraft autopilot, in 
most cases through the Flight Management System 
(FMS), however a direct command path is also 
desirable to minimize delay in time-critical scenarios, 
or in the case of an FMS failure. Typical hardware 
interfaces used for this purpose includes 
RS232/422/485, CANBus and Ethernet.  Aerospace 
standards for these interfaces are published and in-
use in modern airliners like the Boeing 777 and 
Airbus A380 [8]. Interfaces based on a common bus 
(such as CANAerospace, ARINC-825 or the various 
Ethernet based standards such as ARINC 664) are 
often preferred over point-to-point links because of 
the low complexity and transparency when adding 
and removing nodes in the bus.  
Certification Considerations 
In order to certify a SAA system, the regulator 
(via industry bodies such as the RTCA) must 
determine the minimum performance standards and 
testing criteria.  There are several potential 
approaches.  One approach would be for the regulator 
to define hard requirements (prescriptive) of the SAA 
system detection and avoidance characteristics.  
Another approach would be to define the probability 
of a collision, given a collision course threat.  The 
latter approach would allow the manufacturer to trade 
off the SAA system characteristics in light of the 
aircraft's speed, maneuverability, autopilot response 
times, in addition to the raw detection performance of 
the sensing system. 
Whilst there has been lots of discussion and 
proposals generated world-wide surrounding 
technical standards for sense-and-avoid [5, 9], and 
work is ongoing within the RTCA [10], so far the 
only published standard is ASTM F2411 [11], 
although it has not yet been adopted as an approved 
standard by any National Airworthiness Authorities 
(NAAs).  This standard specifies the required 
detection performance in terms of a minimum miss 
distance of 500' (152m).  The system designer would 
                                                      
2 Often image stabilization is performed using information from 
an inertial sensor directly attached to the EO sensor. 
then have to determine the required detection range 
given the aircraft’s performance characteristics in 
order to meet the miss-distance requirement.  This 
standard fails to identify a false alarm rate, however 
as discussed below this may be intentional in order to 
provide some flexibility given operational or mission 
requirements.  False alarms are not in themselves 
safety failures, however a high false-alarm rate would 
impact mission effectiveness, reduce the operator’s 
confidence in the system, and therefore impact upon 
the system dependability.   
Researchers at ARCAA have attempted to 
produce some metrics which may be used to define 
the performance characteristics of a particular SAA 
algorithm, which trades off spatial resolution of the 
vision system against detection range, allowing 
different systems to be more easily compared [6, 12, 
13].  Results from this testing has demonstrated 
practical detection ranges in the order of 1-2km in 
real time, and with reasonable false alarm rates.  
There is no known published information on an 
equivalent human false alarm rate.  The target false 
alarm rate should be set low enough so as not to be a 
nuisance, however must be traded off against the 
desired detection range.  We propose that a target 
false alarm rate in the order of 0.1-1 per flight hour 
would be acceptable in Class G airspace in Australia.  
Airspace with higher traffic density or differing 
mission profiles may need to adopt different false 
alarm rates.  This topic is the subject of further 
investigation. 
Automated Emergency Forced Landing  
Safe Emergency Landing is a critical function 
that is typically triggered by an unscheduled event in 
flight [14-16]. Is most commonly attributed to an 
engine failure, loss of high-level functions such as 
navigation or adverse weather. State-of-the-art 
automated navigation systems already exist for UAS, 
however there is a lack of automation in scenarios 
where the aircraft experiences an emergency 
situation. To date, the most commonly employed 
method to mitigate the severity of a UAS forced 
landing is the use of parachutes or parafoils to retard 
the rate of descent, while still providing some degree 
of controllability for the aircraft. Whilst this concept 
is attractive in that it still enables limited vehicle 
controllability even when both the engine and control 
surfaces have failed, it is highly susceptible to wind 
gusts and other atmospheric effects that may 
adversely affect the final impact point. Our approach 
is based on the premise that the UAS have still some 
degree of flight control so that the aircraft is able to 
maneuver to a desired landing site. In this sense, we 
define four main functions that must be performed 
during an emergency landing such as navigation, 
monitoring, decision-making and control. 
Required functionalities in an emergency landing 
scenario 
The emergency-landing process can be broken 
down into distinct stages, each having a separate 
function [14, 16].  Stage 1 is site selection which 
involves determining the best possible space to 
attempt a landing, considering  factors such as the 
size of the area, its shape, ground slope, surface type 
and obstacles, and proximity to civilization.  
Environmental factors such as the wind direction and 
possible low-level turbulence are also important 
considerations. Detection of a landing area can be 
achieved by monitoring the environment with an 
onboard sensor.  Stage 2 requires planning a path to 
the selected site that the aircraft can be guided along.  
Stage 3 involves final approach guidance to landing, 
which could involve last-second obstacle avoidance.  
At any time, the system may be required to jump 
back to a previous stage if the desired state cannot be 
achieved. Stage 2 and 3 includes functions such as 
navigation, control and decision-making. 
Each main function previously mentioned can be 
typically associated with a given sensor(s). For 
instance, site-selection is most obviously based on a 
visual scan of the terrain in the immediate vicinity of 
the aircraft, and the obstacle-avoidance capability is 
similar to the detection function in a collision 
avoidance system. Therefore, a reasonable choice 
considering reusability and modularity, would be to 
use EO sensors for monitoring the terrain for possible 
landing areas. Once again, the selection of a suitable 
interface for sensors will allow seamlessly integration 
with the image-processing module. In this case, a 
digital interface for the EO sensor will greatly benefit 
the software support and reusability.  
Navigation, decision-making and control 
functions involved in stages 2 and 3, can be typically 
performed by the core processing computer or Flight 
Management System (FMS). These functions are 
closely related with the sense-and-avoid monitoring 
function in instances where the information acquired 
by the EO sensor is used to command in real-time the 
aircraft. In particular, the task of commanding an 
aircraft to a landing site that has been visually 
detected by the EO sensor requires a real-time low-
level link with the autopilot, furthermore it requires 
fast interfaces between the EO sensor and the image-
processing module. Once again, the modern high-
speed digital data-busses with direct command link to 
the autopilot discussed in the previous section are 
required. 
For the emergency-landing function, the authors 
are not aware of any published or proposed 
certification standards. One of the outcomes of the 
current research effort will be to consider how 
regulators might certify such a safety system. 
 
Similar functional requirements between 
applications 
The application or tasks considered in this paper 
share some of the critical functions in any aircraft. 
Navigation, monitoring, decision-making and control 
are generic functionalities that, to some extent, are 
present in any autonomous aircraft. Therefore, seems 
logical to integrate these functions by the use of 
common hardware and software design approaches. 
We describe next these functions in the context of the 
two applications studies. 
Navigation: Traditionally referred as the 
estimation of the aircraft state [17], in this paper we 
refer to navigation as the ability of performing not 
only waypoint navigation but also construction and 
following of specific trajectories between waypoints, 
leaving the guidance of the aircraft to the control 
function. This capability is often referred as path 
planning, and may or may not account for terrain 
evasion. Simple planning strategies such as straight 
line between waypoints, loitering or coordinated 
flight are generally available in most autopilots. 
However when the planning task requires the use of 
more advanced algorithms [18], it entail the use of 
computers with FMS functions. In this case, a core 
processing computer can performs the planning task, 
while an interface with the autopilot allows the 
command and control of the aircraft from the core 
processing computer. Additionally, an interface with 
the image-processing computer will allow the 
dynamic re-planning of trajectories according with 
what the EO sensors are detection. For example, the 
collision avoidance system could command the 
aircraft by issuing commands to the FMS module to 
modify a pre-defined path. 
Control: In this work, we define control as the 
task that is performed in the system that has direct 
access to the control surface actuators. Its main 
purpose is to stabilize the aircraft and command the 
motion of the aircraft between waypoints. This 
function is generally performed by an autopilot, and 
the way and level of interaction with external systems 
varies between manufacturers. For instances, there 
might be autopilot systems that allow access to the 
internal states of the control loops, and therefore 
allow external systems to issue desired values for the 
control loop. The level of interaction also refers to 
whether the autopilot allows access to the position, 
attitude or velocity control loops. The physical 
interface to access the autopilot also varies between 
vendors, but undoubtedly, the use of a common bus 
will permit seamless integration with the payload 
and/or the core processing computer, adding 
important capabilities such as complex path planning 
and sensor-based control. 
Monitoring: This function plays a critical role in 
the applications considered in this paper. By 
monitoring the environment the aircraft is able to 
gain situation awareness as well as gather 
information necessary to perform its task. By using 
EO sensors with similar interfaces, this function can 
be performed in a single image-processing module, 
and by switching the core software task and the 
sensor3, we can enable the capability of sensing other 
aircraft in the airspace or perform an controlled 
emergency landing in case of an onboard failure. 
Decision-making: Is defined as the capability to 
assess multiple attributes or variables in order to 
achieve a single or multiple objectives. Whether the 
system is performing collision avoidance or forced 
landing tasks, this process can be executed in the 
same core processing computer, nonetheless making 
use of different sensors each of them with common 
interfaces.  This approach would facilitate a 
switching strategy where the core software task in 
charge of the decision making process in each task, 
could be enabled or disabled on demand.  
                                                      
3 In most cases EO sensors that are attached to a common digital 
interface can be enabled or disable by simply software 
commands. 
Requirements for a common avionics 
architecture from the safety and risk 
perspective 
Whilst the physical and functional requirements 
for the architecture are important, it is also critical to 
derive requirements for the design from the 
perspective of safety and risk mitigation, so that 
regulators can certify the system for use in civil 
airspace. In this section we apply the concept of the 
Aircraft Certification Matrix (ACM) to help define 
the system Development Assurance Levels (DAL) 
and architecture requirements in accordance with 
acceptable risk criteria. 
Aircraft Certification Matrix 
The Aircraft Certification Matrix (ACM) 
concept has been proposed as a way of systematically 
identifying airworthiness requirements for a given 
system based on its intended operational environment 
[19]. This approach can be compared with the 
classical Part 23/25 certification requirements 
combined with the Part 91/121 operational rules and 
equipage requirements for different intended uses of 
a particular aircraft system.  The ACM makes the 
relationship between operating environment and 
equipment & certification requirements explicit. 
Figure 1 is a simplified version of the ACM 
presented by Clothier et al [19].  The columns of the 
matrix represent different UAS type categories.  This 
paper does not attempt to provide a new framework 
for categorization of UAS types, as the classifications 
schemes are under continuous discussion.  In this 
paper we simply adopt three type categories to 
illustrate our example. 
 
Figure 1: Example Aircraft Certification Matrix 
For illustration purposes, the types could be 
designated by weight and/or kinetic energy limits, for 
example: 
• Type 1 – Small UAS (<25kg, < 30 kts) 
• Type 2 – Medium UAS (<150kg, < 100kts) 
• Type 3 – Large UAS (> 150kg)	  
The rows of the matrix represent operating 
environments.  There would normally be several 
matrices each representing a different aspect of the 
operating environment.  For the emergency landing 
system, we are concerned about the ground 
environment we are operating over, and once again 
we adopt four categories in order to illustrate our 
example. Analysis for the sense-and-avoid system 
would likewise adopt categories for the applicable 
airspace environment.   
• Cat X – Unpopulated	  
• Cat A – Sparsely Populated	  
• Cat B – Moderately Populated	  
• Cat C – Densely Populated	  
 
Finally, the cells of the matrix represent the 
certification categories, in this case 0 through 4. 
Certification Category-0 corresponds to the ‘zero 
risk’ or ‘don’t care’ category.  Certification 
Category-4 corresponds to an operation where an 
accident could result in multiple human fatalities in a 
densely populated area such as a major city.   
This brings us to a discussion of the different 
types of airworthiness requirements that would need 
to be considered for each certification category.  In 
this case, we consider airworthiness in a global sense 
– i.e. all of the elements that contribute to an 
airworthiness system. 
• Basic airworthiness judgment 
• Approved Design Standards 
• Conformity Verification 
• Equipage Requirements 
• Operational Requirements 
• Maintenance Requirements 
• Accident and Incident Investigation 
• Regulatory Compliance 
Figure 2 proposes an example scheme for different 
types of airworthiness requirements to be imposed on 
a particular operation. Justification for particular 
scrutiny in any given area is required, and this would 
normally be the domain of the NAA.  
 
 
Figure 2: Example Airworthiness Certification 
Allocation 
This discussion is important because it informs the 
adoption of a particular system architecture for a 
given operational scenario, and more importantly 
how a common architecture can be adapted to the 
different certification requirements. 
Flight Guardian falls under the categories of Design 
Standards, Conformity Verification and Equipage.  
Design standards and conformity in the sense that the 
architecture is standards based and verified against 
those standards, and equipage in the sense that it 
includes specific functional capabilities to mitigate 
against particular failure conditions.  So the principal 
application of Flight Guardian is for Category 2 to 4 
operations, where the uptake of UAS is currently 
hindered by a lack of technology, standards and 
guidance.   
Assignment of Development Assurance 
Levels 
SAE ARP4754 [20] provides guidelines for 
assigning development assurance levels from the 
aircraft functional level through to the developmental 
item level.  Development assurance is the process 
that establishes confidence that system development 
has been conducted to minimise the likelihood of 
errors that could impact safety.   
The high-level functional requirements are 
summarized as: 
F1. The UA shall be able to sense other aircraft 
in order to prevent a collision; 
a. Observe the environment and sense 
collision course aircraft; 
b. Decide on the best course of action 
to evade a detected collision course 
aircraft; 
c. Execute the avoidance action; F2. The UA shall be able to perform a forced-
landing in the event of an aircraft failure 
preventing continued safe flight and landing, 
where the aircraft remains controllable (i.e. 
propulsion failure);	  a. Determine a suitable landing site;	  b. Guide aircraft to landing site;	  c. Perform final approach obstacle 
avoidance to landing;	  
ARP4754 is designed for application to 
conventionally piloted aircraft, and therefore care 
must be taken when interpreting this guidance in the 
context of UAS.  In particular surrounding the failure 
condition classifications (defined in [21]) that focus 
heavily on the effect of the failure on the operating 
crew and how they might be able to deal with a 
particular failure. In the case of an autonomous UAS 
where there is no crew to consider, the effect must be 
considered in terms of third parties. Nevertheless, the 
guidance provided in this standard for determining 
DALs is still very useful. 
The traditional application of ARP4754 would 
now call for the system-level Functional Hazard 
Assessment. Table 1 lists the failure condition 
classifications from the existing guidance and relates 
them to the suggested ACM classes from Figure 1.  
For example, the functional failure of the emergency-
landing function for a large-UAS over densely 
populated area could result in multiple human 
fatalities.  At the other end of the scale, a Small UAS 
operating in a moderately populated area (ACM 
Class 1) could result in physical discomfort to 3rd 
parties if an engine failure resulted in the UAS hitting 
a house.  Note that whilst more severe injuries could 
occur, the most likely outcome is used to assess the 
classification.  Small UAS operating in sparsely 
populated areas, or all UAS operating in unpopulated 
areas are assumed to have no safety effect.   
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Table 1:  Failure Condition Classifications 
Classification Effect ACM 
Class 
Nom. 
DAL 
Minor Physical Discomfort 1 D 
Major Physical Distress or 
Injury 
2 C 
Hazardous Serious or fatal injury 3 B 
Catastrophic Multiple fatal injuries 4 A 
 
Application of the standard allows for 
consideration of the probability of emergency 
conditions when determining the DAL. So the 
designer can now consider the probability of 
requiring the sense-and-avoid or emergency landing 
function. For example, if the P(emergency landing) < 
10-5, a Level A requirement can be reduced to Level 
B.  Table 2 presents a suggested mapping of the 
certification categories to DALs based on this 
guidance.   
For the loss of function failure condition, Flight 
Guardian must make a real-time assessment of the 
current operating conditions to determine if the flight 
can proceed.  If the system were operating as a Cat 4 
flight, the flight should be re-planned to a lower level 
in order to mitigate the reduction in safety margin 
caused by the failure.   
Table 2:  Mapping of Certification Category to 
DAL 
Cert 
Cat 
Nom. 
DAL 
P(event) 
< 10-4 
P(event) 
< 10-5 
P(event) 
< 10-7 
0 E E E E 
1 D E E E 
2 C D D E 
3 B C C C 
4 A A B C 
The mappings for certification categories 3 and 
4 are derived directly from ARP4754.  However there 
is no guidance provided for the lower risk levels 
associated with categories 1 and 2.  We have 
extrapolated the reductions in DAL from categories 3 
and 3 into categories 1 and 2.  In any case, the risk 
posed by categories 1 and 2 are much lower, and the 
principal application for Flight Guardian will be in 
category 3 and 4 operations.   
For events with sufficiently low probability, 
such as mid-air collision [9], a DAL of B or C would 
seem to be suitable.  This is consistent with the DAL 
requirement for TCAS-II, which is also level B.  
Similarly for the emergency forced landing function, 
a DAL commensurate with the event probability is 
appropriate.  The designer would need to take into 
account several external and operational factors when 
determining the probability of impact with a densely 
populated area. 
Application of ALARP 
The ALARP (“As low as reasonably 
practicable”) concept seeks to provide a framework 
for assessing the acceptability of risks relative to the 
status quo and reducing risks to tolerable levels 
through mitigation strategies, taking into account a 
reasonable cost of risk reduction [22].  The benefits 
of this approach are obvious at the high-level system 
of systems architecture development, where 
subjective societal issues and risk perception 
dominate the decision process.  ALARP provides the 
framework for determining whether or not the 
inclusion of a particular risk mitigation strategy is 
worth the cost of implementation.  However, there 
are several challenges to applying ALARP in a 
systematic and objective manner at the lower levels 
of complex hardware and software development [23, 
24].  Investigation into this method should be the 
subject of further investigation. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented an approach to derive 
requirements for the Flight Guardian system 
architecture.  We examined common features 
between onboard functions in this architecture to 
propose certain guidelines in the design of the 
system. Furthermore, we assessed the safety, 
dependability and risk to derive requirements using 
an Aircraft Certification Matrix to define the system 
Development Assurance Level (DAL). Flight 
Guardian provides a unified sensing and processing 
architecture enabling sense-and-avoid and automated 
forced landing functions for an UAS. 
The certification approach applied in this work 
allows the designer to determine the required level of 
system development assurance for the Flight 
Guardian system.  This allows system architects the 
flexibility in configuring Flight Guardian for a 
particular operational profile (certification category).  
Therefore the implementation cost and certification 
burden is commensurate with the safety risk posed by 
the particular operation. 
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